The bizonal, bicommunal federation model has been the basis of negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem since 1977. This article examines whether this model is appropriate under today’s circumstances and looks into the factors that contribute to the acceptance and successful functioning of such a power-sharing democracy.
THIS ARTICLE refers to the theories and empirical observations of Professor Arend Lijphart, a leading authority on the subject of power sharing and author of Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing And Majority Rule In Theory And Practice, on which this piece is based.
The establishment of democracy appears particularly difficult in states which lack a homogeneous population and where deep cleavages divide compact groups based on ethnicity, language, religion, ideology. British philosopher, John Stuart Mill, considered democracy almost impossible in multiethnic societies and impossible in societies lacking a common language. Professor Lijphart appears more optimistic and advocates the power sharing model of democracy as the one best suited for divided societies.
The definition of power sharing adopted by Lijphart has 4 main characteristics:
(1) coalition governments that include all major groups,
(2) cultural autonomy for these groups (which can take up to 3 forms: federalism in states where the groups are geographically concentrated; separate autonomous education; and different laws on personal matters such as marriage, divorce),
(3) proportionality in political representation and the civil service,
(4) a minority veto with regard to vital rights (institutionalised or commonly accepted).
The basic model of democracy relies on the principle of majority rule while the rights and liberties of the individual are safeguarded against the “tyranny of the majority” through the constitution. The power-sharing model of democracy goes a step further and recognises rights not only to individuals but also to groups, thereby ensuring that minorities will not be permanently excluded from government and that their culture enjoys equal respect.
This model has been adopted by Switzerland (1943), Belgium(1970), Malaysia (1975), India (1948), and Lebanon (1943-1975 and from 1989). Recent examples are South Africa, Northern Ireland and Bosnia. Power sharing prevailed in the Netherlands for fifty years (to 1967) and Austria for twenty years (to 1966).
Power sharing is not an easy option, as evidenced by its failure in countries like Nigeria and Uruguay, the problems faced by Lebanon, and its abandonment by Czechoslovakia leading to the “velvet divorce”. Serious problems are faced in Northern Ireland and Bosnia, as well as in Belgium.
In the case of Cyprus, it can be easily ascertained that the 1960 regime meets all four characteristics that define the power sharing model (note: federalism is not a prerequisite). In view of the failure of power sharing in Cyprus, one may be justified in thinking that the solution to the problem lies elsewhere. However, the dramatic events of 1974 and the enforced geographical separation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have deepened further the cleavages separating the two communities. Therefore, Lijphart’s political theory about divided societies suggests that the power sharing model is still the right choice if the unity of the state is to be maintained.
The pursued bizonal, bicommunal federation is indeed fully compatible with the power sharing model. The only substantial change compared with the 1960 model is the introduction of federal arrangements. This perhaps explains the anti-federalist stance often met within the Greek Cypriot side. However, it should at last be realised that opposition is not really directed at federalism per se but at power sharing democracy organised along federal lines. It is unlikely that there would be a similar reaction if the proposed federal model were that of the US, Germany, or Australia which do not recognise group rights.
Success factors
Following a comparative evaluation among the various states which grappled with power sharing, Lijphart arrived at nine factors which influence the probability that power sharing will be instituted and maintained in divided societies.
These nine factors can be applied to the situation in Cyprus thus enabling us to evaluate using objective criteria the probability of adopting a sustainable power sharing federation. It should be stressed that we are talking about probability, and, therefore, neither a strong positive evaluation guarantees success, nor conversely a strong negative evaluation implies inevitable failure.
From the nine factors, the first two are considered the most important:
(1) The biggest obstacle in accepting power sharing is the existence of a large solid majority, which understandably finds it very difficult to share power with a minority. Lijphart considers this to be the main factor behind the failure of the 1960 regime. The recent vehement Greek Cypriot reaction against an alternating presidency should be seen in this context.
(2) The second serious impediment is the prevalence of significant socioeconomic differences among the groups. The prosperous group is not willing to share power or subsidise the less privileged ones. The perceived financial burden of a settlement was one of the main arguments brought by the wealthier Greek Cypriots against the 2004 UN Plan.
(3) If few groups participate in negotiations, the process is less complex. Applies to Cyprus as only two groups are involved.
(4) In the absence of a large majority group, if the groups are of similar size it is easier to reach agreement. Not applicable to Cyprus.
(5) A small population facilitates the decision-making process. Applicable to Cyprus.
(6) External dangers can help to promote internal unity (e.g. the war between India and China in 1962 contributed to unity in the former in the difficult years after independence). In Cyprus the opposite has occurred. The two sides felt to be threatened unilaterally by Greece and Turkey. The Turkish invasion of 1974 and the resulting occupation precluded any chance of achieving unity between the communities. Moreover, it has rendered the solution of the Cyprus problem even more complex (occupation army, settlers, guarantees).
(7) If groups are geographically concentrated then federalism can be introduced to enhance group self-government, thus minimising the potential areas of conflict. In this respect, the introduction of federalism in Cyprus marks a major improvement and offers better prospects of success vis-à-vis the system of 1960. However, the conditions that now allow federalism were created by Turkey in 1974 through the use of force. Even though federalism has been accepted as a historic compromise by the majority Greek Cypriot side, the prospects of success are evidently not the same as in a country where geographical concentration has evolved over a long period and is generally accepted (e.g. Switzerland).
(8) A sense of common identity and of loyalty to the state erodes the dividing lines and can coexist with ethnic, religious or cultural loyalties of the different groups. The European Union (EU) is an obvious example at the interstate rather than intrastate level. In Cyprus, however, the anachronistic education system and the nationalistic elite on both sides have always been an obstacle to the fostering of coexistence.
(9) A culture of compromise and accommodation can play a significant role in accepting power sharing. Moreover, the leadership can have a determining influence in creating a political environment conducive to compromise and accommodation. India is a country with a compromise tradition and was also fortunate to have a consensus leader of the stature of Nehru in the crucial post-independence period. Such a tradition is absent in Cyprus and the leadership has overall failed to make any meaningful contribution to this end.
The above evaluation of the Cyprus situation shows that only factors (3) and (5) are satisfied. The remaining seven factors are not met, including the first two important ones (absence of a solid majority and group socioeconomic parity). It should not come as a surprise that Switzerland is in line with all the factors while India meets seven (except the two met by Cyprus).
The power sharing model, in the form of a bizonal, bicommunal federation, appears to be the best choice for overcoming the deep cleavages that have divided Cyprus since the 1950s and for avoiding partition. However, given the scale of divergence of the Cyprus reality in relation to Lijphart’s nine factors, the probability of success of power sharing can only be assessed as low.
Going beyond Lijphart’s nine factors, consideration should be given to any major additional factors that could apply to Cyprus in particular.
Undoubtedly, since 2004 the EU constitutes a major positive factor. Cyprus’ accession in conjunction with Turkey’s objective to achieve EU membership provides a strong incentive to the latter to co-operate in finding a mutually acceptable power sharing solution (assuming that the Greek Cypriot side will not be swayed by the misleading premise that power sharing is not compatible with EU democratic principles).
Moreover, the chances of success of a new partnership within the consensus and compromise framework that the EU provides are clearly better compared to the conditions prevailing in 1960. It is considered unlikely though that on the strength of this single factor the probability of success improves dramatically from our low assessment above.
Given that the probability of success of a new power sharing arrangement does not appear high, it is imperative for the weaker Greek Cypriot side to evaluate carefully the repercussions in case of failure. In the event that a new partnership proves dysfunctional what are the possible repercussions?
The argument often voiced in Greek Cypriot circles is that the outcome would be the collapse of the state and the subjugation of the whole of Cyprus to Turkey. This approach evidently considers the matter under the terms of conflict prevailing in 1960 and 1974. Conversely, if the compromise and accommodation terms that typify today’s EU prevail, the peaceful handling of failure is perceivable.
Unless the Greek Cypriot side is reasonably convinced that the second scenario is prevalent it should refrain from entering a new partnership arrangement. Moreover, the whole strategy of the Greek Cypriot side at the negotiations should be geared firstly to securing that the terms of a solution reduce as much as possible the relatively high probability of failure (for example by not insisting on a strong central government) and secondly to the inclusion of terms that allow room for a peaceful “velvet divorce” after a period if the new partnership were to become untenable.
- Socrates Solomides is a business consultant and former Managing Director of CISCO
