We, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, exercising our inherent constitutive power, by our free and democratic, separately expressed common will adopt this Foundation Agreement – from the Preamble to the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, 31 March 2004
IT HAS been five years since Cypriots were called upon to decide the fate of their nation. On April 24, 2004 the ‘Annan Plan’ was placed before the two communities in a simultaneous vote in the reunification referendum of. The proposal received a 65 per cent favourable vote from the Turkish Cypriot community, but the Greek Cypriot community rejected it by nearly 76 per cent. Since implementation of the plan was dependent on its approval by both communities, reunification did not take place.
Was it for better or worse? A missed opportunity? And would a solution have actually worked? Questions such as these no doubt still haunt most Cypriots, whether they ticked the ‘yes’ or the ‘no’ box on that spring day.
Three analysts who spoke to the Sunday Mail all agreed on one point: that the question of whether we would be better off today can only be addressed through reverse logic, that is, by comparing the present situation with what might have been. And whereas the omens for a settlement are probably worse now than five years ago, that is not the same as saying that the Annan plan would, or should, have worked or that it should have been accepted. In short, the ‘I told you so’ punchline peddled by supporters of the plan doesn’t quite cut it.
“The jury’s still out on the alternative offered by the opponents of the Annan Plan, who told people to be patient because they could secure a better solution, a so-called ‘European solution’. Whether these politicians were right…only time will tell,” remarks Stavros Tombazos, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Cyprus. “Yet you can’t help but notice that circumstances are changing for the worse.”
Because Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan in 2004, he says, Turkish Cypriots started to think Greek Cypriots did not want to live together with them. “This disappointment is palpable, and can be seen in opinion polls. So the ‘yes’ vote of the Turkish Cypriot community in a new referendum cannot be taken for granted.”
Hurbert Faustmann, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Nicosia, believes the challenges for the current peace drive are as daunting as they were five years ago.
“What powers, what role, do you give a minority of 18 per cent in a reunified state? That’s always been the crux of the Cyprus problem. To come up with a formula that addresses this issue requires immense ingenuity. Many Turkish Cypriots feel as if they’re sandwiched between the Greek Cypriots and Turkey. The Greek Cypriots need to convince them that they are the lesser of two evils.”
Is it a case of visiting the last-chance saloon? Last weekend, Turkish Cypriot nationalists won the ‘legislative elections’ in the north, a result analysts say could further complicate efforts to settle the decades-long division. The victorious UBP is calling for a full two-state model for Cyprus that has been rejected by Greek Cypriots. With the ‘presidential elections’ looming next year, and moderate Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat facing the prospect of being ousted from power, the noose is tightening. Speculation is growing that foreign diplomats are calling for a big push in reunification talks this autumn before time runs out.
“Talat may not even be a candidate next year,” says political commentator Loucas Charalambous. “What then?”
“I’m sad to say, but it is the Greek Cypriots who have wasted five years. Like I’ve said many times, a big part of this responsibility falls on President Christofias. His decision to pursue peace talks from scratch was a grave mistake. It would have made far more sense to resume negotiations where they had left off, that is to say, the Annan Plan,” he says.
“What is truly ironic, is that Christofias did not need to switch tracks. He could have easily cited the April 2005 document approved by the National Council which called for certain changes to the Annan Plan.”
Charalambous is also against having a referendum on a possible new settlement deal.
“When you pass the buck to the people, they will weigh the plan and decide according to their own vested interests. That is what happened in 2004, and that is what is going to happen again. Not only in Cyprus, but everywhere, only a small minority of the public can look past their narrow interests and see the ‘big picture’.
“We Greek Cypriots have not yet grasped that, being the defeated side, it is not possible for all our human rights to be restored. We need to compromise. But it’s something that we don’t understand, or don’t want to understand.”
Admittedly, trying to answer the question “where would we be today had the island been reunified’ is a speculative exercise; and far from helping, hindsight can be a double-edged sword since it can lead to false assumptions, or to assumptions that perhaps were true then but not anymore. Nevertheless, there are certain ‘facts’ that we can use as a staging point in the quest for that answer.
Refugees/Properties/Territorial Adjustment
Assuming the territorial adjustment went smoothly, it would have been completed three-and-a-half years after the entry into force of the agreement, that is, by early 2008. At this time, up to 90,000 Greek Cypriots would have been eligible to move back into their abandoned properties inside the fenced-off city of Famagusta and in Morphou, and thousands more returned to assorted villages under Turkish Cypriot administered areas. In total, 65 villages in the TRNC would by now have been ceded to the Greek Cypriot constituent state. An estimated 48 thousand Turkish Cypriots would have moved out of their homes.
The adjustment would be carried out in six phases, starting from 104 days, six months, one-and-a-half years, two-and-a-half years, three years and three-and-a-half years. The transfer was set to begin with villages closest to the Green Line, and then taking a roughly south-north progression.
Louroujina, Pyla, and the town of Varosha were included in the first transfer phase. The sixth and final stage included the villages of Morphou, Ayia, Marina, Kondemenos, Ashia,
Kormakitis (pocket) and Pyrga, to name but a few.
Such an arrangement seems highly unlikely today, argues Stavros Tombazos, because the situation on the ground has changed drastically.
“Since 2004, authorities in the north have distributed Greek Cypriot properties among Turkish Cypriot couples. And the political rhetoric from Turkish Cypriot politicians, even the moderates, can be summed up as follows: ‘Forget about Morphou’.”
Far from being circumstantial, the unprecedented economic boom in the area post-2004 was a direct result of political developments.
In fact, according to Tombazos, the new climate prevailing in the north in the aftermath of the referenda created a sense of security among investors from Turkey, who began pouring money into the occupied areas, leading to a massive construction build-up in areas such as Kyrenia, Ayios Epiktitos and the Karpas.
In Tombazos’ mind, in this respect, “yes, we have taken a step backwards.”
Charalambous shares this bleak assessment:
“The faits accomplis on the ground have increased geometrically in the last five years,” he says.
From 2004 to the present day, the number of dwellings built atop Greek Cypriot properties in the north are several times those built in the entire period 1974-2004.
“How can all these properties be returned to their rightful owners? There is only one option left for the re
fugees – compensation,” adds Charalambous.
According to Article 9 of the UN blueprint, “Special arrangements shall safeguard the rights and interests of current inhabitants of areas subject to territorial adjustment, and provide for orderly relocation to adequate alternative accommodation in appropriate locations where adequate livelihoods may be earned.”
Supposing a settlement had been approved, would this territorial adjustment, which is inexorably entwined with the issue of the properties, have worked?
Again, hard to tell. Hubert Faustmann sees the territorial adjustments as one of the “less problematic” aspects of the settlement, but is quick to point to the daunting logistics of the task.
“What it means is that thousands of homes would have to be built elsewhere before their Turkish Cypriot inhabitants could be relocated to alternative premises. Realistically, delays in the agreed timetable for territorial adjustments would have been inevitable…but whether or not that would have been a deal-breaker is another story.”
The Economy
The EU’s estimate of reconstruction costs, £1.3bn sterling over five years, was lower than that of Mehmet Ali Talat, then Turkish Cypriot ‘Prime Minister’, who said more than £2bn was needed. Nicosia’s assessment went as high as £7bn. The cash boost for reconstruction and compensation would have come from international donors.
Reconstruction: boon or bane? Again, with each side marshalling its economic experts, the debate was tinted politically. A clear-cut answer is out of reach.
Faustmann recalls for example, how Dinos Lordos, the prominent businessman, had been one of those who ominously warned that the cost of reconstruction would have run the island’s economy into the ground.
“Their premise was that the building spree would have led to an over-supply, bringing real-estate prices crashing down. In turn, the argument goes, this would have put off foreign donors seeing that reconstruction is a lost cause.”
Needless to say, most advocates of the Annan Plan did not share this dire forecast. Charalambous insists only good things could have come out of reconstruction:
“You’d have a massive expansion in economic activity. It doesn’t matter whether you’re building a house for your daughter in Paphos, building a new house for a Turkish Cypriot to move into, or repairing the house of a Greek Cypriot refugee,” he says.
Settlers
Under the Annan Plan, no more than 45,000 persons who were not citizens of their respective constituent state would have been allowed to remain on the island.
A census taken two years ago in the north reported the population to be 267,000. Speaking only a few days ago, outgoing Turkish Cypriot ‘Prime Minister’ Ferdi Sabit Soyer said the total number of Turkish settlers was estimated at 100,000. Conventional wisdom calculates the numbers of Turkish Cypriots to be some 80,000. The rest are foreign students (40,000) and expats and foreign workers living temporarily in the occupied areas.
Article 3 of the Foundation Agreement (‘Citizenship, residency and identity’) stated: In addition, for a transitional period of 19 years or until Turkey’s accession to the European Union, whichever is earlier, Cyprus may limit the right of Greek nationals to reside in Cyprus if their number has reached 5% of the number of resident Cypriot citizens holding Greek Cypriot internal constituent state citizenship status, and the right of Turkish nationals to reside in Cyprus if their number has reached 5% of the number of resident Cypriot citizens holding Turkish Cypriot internal constituent state citizenship status.”
A few days before the referenda, the two communities handed over to the UN Secretary-General their respective lists of non-Cypriots that would stay on the island. According to Loucas Charalambous, the list supplied by the Turkish Cypriot side did not even amount to the 45,000 cap.
“If memory serves, their list included between 40,000 and 41,000 names. Now contrast that to the 100,000 settlers currently living in the north and who are increasing by the day.”
But whether 41,000 or 45,000, one shouldn’t get hung up on details, notes Tombazos.
“The main thing we should bear in mind is that these restrictions were enshrined in the very law of the new state. As things stand, hypothetically speaking, Turkey can change the demographics of the island at will by bringing in settlers from Anatolia.”
There is possibly another parameter to the growing presence of Turkish settlers who eventually acquire Turkish Cypriot ‘citizenship’ through marriage. History has shown, for example in Israel, that settlers oftentimes tend to hold more hardline views than the ‘natives’. As more and more Turkish settlers acquire Turkish Cypriot citizenship, they will be eligible to vote in a new referendum. There’s a perception that these people may overwhelmingly vote ‘no’.
But that’s a false assumption, asserts Loucas Charalambous.
“The old part of Famagusta is mainly inhabited by Turkish nationals. And yet in 2004 more than 60 per cent of people hailing from this area voted in favour of the peace plan. Similarly in the Morphou area, 65 per cent voted for the Annan Plan, despite the fact they would have been relocated. On the other hand, that doesn’t mean they would vote the same way again.”
Government
The Annan Plan provided for a collective Presidential Council, made up of six voting members, allocated according to population (per present levels, four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots), and selected and voted in by parliament. An additional three non-voting members would be assigned 2:1. The President and Vice President, chosen by the Presidential Council from among its members, one from each community, would alternate in their functions every 20 months during the council’s five-year term of office.
The Presidential Council would be elected on a single list by special majority in the Senate and approved by majority in the Chamber of Deputies for a five-year term. The Senate (the upper house), would have 48 members, divided 24:24 between the two communities.
It also provided for a Supreme Court (Constitutional Court) composed of equal numbers of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges, plus three foreign judges; to be appointed by the Presidential Council. The drafters of the settlement plan saw the Supreme Court as the final deadlock-resolving mechanism. Under Article 6 of the plan, “The Supreme Court shall, inter alia, resolve disputes between the constituent states or between one or both of them and the federal government, and resolve on an interim basis deadlocks within federal institutions if this is indispensable to the proper functioning of the federal government.”
Much has since been said of this system. Some have called it a recipe for disaster, because it is not clear what would happen if the Supreme Court itself was hung. Others distrusted and simultaneously resented the notion of having foreign judges ultimately calling the shots, seeing this as an insult to the people of Cyprus.
Hubert Faustmann sees these as valid arguments, but points out that the system was perhaps the best formula available under the circumstances.
“In the event of a dispute between the two constituent states, because of its composition the Presidential Council could ‘cope’ with one hardliner from the Turkish Cypriot side and perhaps two from the Greek Cypriot side. And in the worst-case scenario, you’d turn to the Supreme Court and the foreign judges, who one should think of as neutral. At the end of the day, I think it was a flexible system. It certainly afforded a way out of stalemates, while the same cannot be said of the 1960 Constitution, where federal government decisions were vetoed and then ignored, leading to paralys
is.
“But again, do we know whether it would work in real life? There’s no way to know unless you put it to the test.”
Charalambous recalls that the idea for the three foreign judges was actually the brainchild of the Greek Cypriot negotiators, keen to avoid the deadlocks of the past. However, the concept was subsequently torn to shreds by then President Tassos Papadopoulos.
Military
Article 8 (‘Demilitarisation’) of the UN plan stated: “Cyprus shall be demilitarised, and all Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces, including reserve units, shall be dissolved, and their arms removed from the island, in phases synchronised with the redeployment and adjustment of Greek and Turkish forces. … There shall be no paramilitary or reserve forces or military or paramilitary training of citizens. All weapons except licensed sporting guns shall be prohibited.”
Moreover, under the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops from the island, assuming it went on schedule, today there would be no more than 6,000 Turkish military (officers and soldiers).
“One cannot play down the importance of demilitarising the island,” observes Charalambous.
“Since 1974 not a single shot has been fired, except for the events at Dherynia in 1996. Because of this, Greek Cypriots have been lulled into a false sense of security. But one should not forget that having a foreign army stationed on the island is always a threat. If time is allowed to pass, which can only entrench the division, we may very well wake up one morning to find our borders shared with the major power called Turkey.”
Would Ankara have played ball, or might it forget its pledge to withdraw troops before the ink dried on the paper?
That’s another of those “what if” queries. But by inverting the question, Faustmann is willing to venture a guess:
“Over the past five years, there have been no indications that Turkey would not have honoured the agreement. This goes as much for demilitarisation as for the territorial adjustments. So we can reasonably assume that Turkey would have complied, not wishing to jeopardise its chances of EU accession. After all, Turkish diplomacy views ‘concessions’ on Cyprus as a tradeoff for its European aspirations.”
Sidebar
* Up to 90,000 Greek Cypriot refugees return to their properties under Greek Cypriot administration
* Sixty-five villages in the now occupied areas come under Greek Cypriot administration
* Thousands more Greek Cypriots return to their native villages under Turkish Cypriot administration
* Turkish army contingent (all ranks) numbers no more than 6,000; reduction in heavy ordnance
* Maximum number of settlers 45,000
