I HAVE known Demetris Christofias since 1987 when he emerged as a new political star.
By then the AKEL chief for 40 years, Ezekias Papaioannou – with whom I had excellent relations since my days at the foreign office – was already in old age. Papaioannou had disclosed to me that he considered Christofias fit to become the new AKEL chief and was going to bypass the incumbent leadership. In July 1987, he also appointed Demetris as liaison officer between AKEL and my party (The Liberal Party) as at that time we both supported George Vassiliou in the presidential elections in February 1988.
Demetris, a young man with a bright face, unpretentious, honest, kind-hearted and sensitive, had all the traits that Ezekias required. But he also possessed the supreme qualification, which was a sine qua non for Ezekias: Moscow was Demetris’ holy shrine and its teachings were his Holy Communion.
I was musing recently on the smiling and carefree Demetris of those years and contrasting it with the images of those who perished as a result of the indifference and irresponsibility displayed in the Mari explosion of July 11. Everybody and everything were targeting Demetris – after all whom should they target, other than the leader?
How did this man, who started life as a barefoot boy in Dikomo village, manage to elevate himself to the top echelons of power? How did he really end up included in the curses of the mothers, the fathers, the wives, the children of the “13”, who were sound and strong at 5.45 am on July 11 and just seconds later were gone forever.
I have worked with Demetris on many occasions since 1987. From July 1987 to February 1988 he often visited the Liberal Party offices. Thereafter, when Vassiliou was elected, we spent six weeks in the summer and three weeks in November 1992 in talks on the Ghali “Set of Ideas” at the Waldorf Astoria, in New York. We also worked together in 1997 at Troutbeck (USA) and Glion (Switzerland) during the Clerides-Denktash talks.
In our talks Demetris was a realist and down to earth. His party however was his primary concern, everything else followed. He had a strong social sense – desperately seeking true social justice – which has never existed and never will in our ruthless world, irrespective of efforts by Demetris and the like. He believed firmly that communism is the source of such justice, ignoring the despicable events in the Soviet Union (Siberia, intrigues, murders of millions of people) from the 1917 revolution to the system’s collapse in 1990. After all, AKEL has made it clear many times in the past – and as far as I know has never retracted this position – that if and when the Cyprus problem is resolved, its objective will be the introduction of a soviet type communist system in Cyprus.
I believe that the events at Mari emanate from two main elements of Christofias’ belief system.
The first is his deep devotion to communism and his intense dislike of “imperialism” which led him to follow the wrong path in regard to the deadly cargo. Demetris may be flattered by the fact that he rubs shoulders with the European political elite, and he may have found an ally, Israel, imposed on him by the oil potential, but in reality, his heart is always close to the Fidel Castros (opening of embassy which he personally attended), the Assads (“we are in the same trench” – my God, what a trench) and the Chavezes (cheap oil, which we never saw) of this planet. Thus he kept “death” in Cyprus “for political reasons”, so that he might hand over the cargo to Assad one day, as he apparently promised him.
The second element is the peculiar way in which Christofias apparently runs the country, probably influenced by the Soviet system. In Soviet Moscow, if a directive of Brezhnev was not executed and things went wrong, he would remain seated on his throne and heads would start rolling. Could this ever apply in Cyprus? Could the supreme Commander run the country without having before his eyes hundreds of notes in respect of important issues delegated to his ministers, for an effective follow-up? Is it really possible that the phrase uttered by the former Defence Minister Costas Papacostas to the former foreign minister: “Marcos (Kyprianou), you have shifted the burden of responsibility onto my shoulders and you are all pulling out” be the tune ringing in our ears, as the epilogue of this tragedy?
At this point I would like to refer to another subject to which I believe the president should pay a lot of heed.
In Cyprus’ offshore Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) there are apparently rather large quantities of oil and/or natural gas – not as big as the imagination of some people created them, but huge by the standards of Cyprus. (When, as commerce minister around 10-12 years ago, I stated that we probably had oil and gas in the sea and started EEZ negotiations with Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Israel, I became the object of derision. Now everyone is running after oil.)
Oil, historically, has been a source of wealth and welfare but at the same time it has caused havoc, because of the colossal interests involved. In our case there have been persistent and dangerous claims by Turkey which has declined to sign the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Recently Lebanon (which has declined to ratify the EEZ Agreement sighed with us) has raised objections too. So, apart from the small player (Cyprus) we now have the big boys in the game: Israel, Turkey and Lebanon (and Hezbollah which hides behind Lebanon).
From the outset, I could “smell” the dangers. This was actually the reason why Greece has avoided for the past 35 years any involvement in Aegean oil – she now talks only about oil in the lonian Sea and offshore Crete. Consequently I put forward a plan, which I have repeated many times during the past five years. Under this we should seek an agreement with the Turkish Cypriots (not with Turkey) under the auspices of the United Nations. The plan would ensure that from the Republic’s net income from oil and gas reserves an agreed percentage would be deposited in an escrow account in favour of the Turkish Cypriots. The money would be payable either upon solution of the Cyprus problem or at a fixed time to be agreed, whichever happens earlier. Former Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, for one, welcomed my proposal and told me that if the Cyprus government accepted the plan he was prepared to take it up with Ankara. Our own side, however, said nothing.
The above proposal would protect our self respect and our sovereignty (which are now in danger), avoid any military adventures and be seen as a constructive gesture to the other community which might prove conducive to solving the Cyprus problem. We would also be able to proceed without delay or hindrance with exploiting our hydrocarbon wealth, which may be worth $400-$500 billion or 0.5 per cent of the world reserves, before it is cannibalised by our neighbours.
When very large interests are involved, strong countries do not easily back down. And as the wise man of Africa, former president of Tanzania Julius Nyerere, once said using an old African proverb: “When elephants fight, it is the grass below their feet that suffers.”
In our case, between Israel, Turkey, Hezbollah and Cyprus, we are unfortunately the grass.
Nicos Rolandis is a former foreign minister, commerce and industry minister and leader of the Liberal Party
