THE former chief of the National Guard said yesterday he did what he could to warn of the dangers posed by a munitions cargo that blew up killing 13 men but did not assume any responsibility for the July 11 incident, which also incapacitated the island’s main power station.
Retired lieutenant general Petros Tsalikidis, who resigned hours after the blast at the Evangelos Florakis naval base, also voiced his displeasure at President Demetris Christofias assigning part of the blame on him during his testimony at the same inquiry on September 5.
“I do not accept and categorically deny this claim,” Tsalikidis told the inquiry. “I noted the dangers posed by storing the containers at the naval base from the first month I assumed my duties as National Guard commander.”
Tsalikidis assumed the leadership on May 1, 2009, over a month after the munitions, stored in 98 containers seized from a ship sailing from Iran to Syria, were stacked together on the naval base, neighbouring the Vassilikos power station.
Tsalikidis said the National Guard had never assumed responsibility for the condition of the cargo – “the National Guard did not even have access to the contents”.
He said he did not know the criteria considered when deciding to store the munitions at the base, but told the inquiry of a memo that warned against anchoring the ship – the Monchegorsk — carrying the containers off the coast of Vassilikos “because it neighbours Cyprus’ largest power station.”
The memo concerned a February 6, 2009 meeting at the offices of the marine police in Limassol that discussed moving the ship to another location – away from Limassol — for reasons of better safekeeping.
“It emerges from the memo that in any case the cargo should have been kept away from a residential area,” Tsalikidis said. “However, it appears that the serious dangers posed by putting the seized cargo on the base… were ignored or overlooked.”
The former commander said he had warned of the risks and there was nothing else he could do.
Investigator Polys Polyviou asked whether that was enough.
“Shouldn’t the commander of the army who is responsible for the military camps and the soldiers either go to the president or the defence minister and tell him the situation is unacceptable and I will resign?”
Tsalikides said he did more than what he was authorised to do: “I don’t think my resignation would have led to any solutions.”
He said the potential of self-ignition or explosion of the munitions was there from the beginning but he could not know the degree of the risk.
“I did what I ought to do, verbally and through documents,” Tsalikidis said.
Asked by Polyviou why he did not raise the issue during a February 7, 2011 meeting with, among others, the foreign and defence ministers, Tsalikidis said he could not intervene in the presence of two senior politicians – effectively bypassing the defence minister.
The risks had been raised at that meeting, but in the end it had been decided, on the suggestion of former foreign minister Marcos Kyprianou, to send samples of the gunpowder stored in the containers for tests to determine whether they had been altered.
From then on it appears the decision was bogged down in bureaucratic procedures that included the Greek munitions company meant to carry out the tests, until June 7, 2011.
“As far as I know the correspondence ends here,” Tsalikidis said, without the samples ever being sent.
The final warning came early in July when one the containers bulged and its doors partially forced open, apparently after the gunpowder self-ignited.
The situation was assessed on July 6 and it was decided to install a system to douse the stack with water and bring in a crane to remove the container that bulged.
Tsalikidis said he had been briefed on the same day but none of the experts had mentioned evacuating the area.
In hindsight “it seems this should have been the main measure suggested by experts and those participating in the committee, who unfortunately do not seem to have realised and assessed the risk correctly,” Tsalikidis said.
Asked by Polyviou if this was not enough for him, Tsalikidis said he had no expertise.
“I don’t know the degree of the danger but it appears evacuation was the appropriate action,” the former armed forced commander said.
