There is little doubt that the misfortunes of Cyprus have to a large extent been caused by the involvement of Greece and Turkey in the political affairs of the island. It is ironic that these two countries which have often undermined the smooth functioning of what is in theory an independent state were elevated, under the 1960 constitution, to “guarantor powers”.
Greece was a captive of “Megali Idea” (the Great Vision) which included the political union of Cyprus with Greece. For Turkey, it was the partition of the island into two components, which would then be allocated to the two “motherlands”. The fact is that, in practical terms, the involvement of the two “homelands” in Cyprus has followed two distinctively different paths.
Greece
In 1915, Greece turned down a British offer for Cyprus to become part of Greece in return of Greece entering the war on their side. In 1950, Nicolaos Plastiras, the then prime minister of Greece, took a negative stand against a referendum for the union of Cyprus with Greece while Alexandros Papagos, the next Greek prime minister, believed that the appeal before the United Nations in respect of Cyprus was premature and doomed to fail. Similar reservations had been expressed by the Greek government in respect of the Eoka struggle. The two proposed plans for the resolution of the Cyprus problem which followed were supported by the Greek government but were rejected by the Cyprus leadership. In relation to the London-Zurich Agreements which followed, Constantinos Karamanlis would bitterly say that, “although these documents had been jointly signed by both Makarios and myself, Makarios was subsequently treated as a hero while I was branded a traitor.”
Soon after the declaration of Cyprus’ independence, Makarios’ attempt to unilaterally change the Cyprus constitution on what became known as “the 13 Points” was criticised by Greece which also objected to the use of force by the newly formed National Guard – a course of action that provoked the bombing of Tylliria by the Turkish air force.
Then came the dictatorship in Greece and its conflict with the Makarios regime in Cyprus. In essence, this was the only occasion that Greece ended being actively involved in the political affairs of Cyprus, leading to the coup d’ etat in July of 1974 and the Turkish invasion.
Once democracy was restored in Greece, a series of attempts followed, mainly on the part of the United Nations, to normalise the situation in Cyprus. These efforts were either openly supported or silently accepted by successive Greek governments (because of the fear that their open acceptance might cause a political backlash) but were rejected by Greek Cypriots. Indeed, “distancing” was the reaction of Costas Karamanlis, the then newly elected prime minister of Greece, when he was confronted with the Annan Plan.
The second intervention of Greece in the political affairs of Cyprus after 1974 took place in 2017, initially at Mont Pelerin and then at Crans-Montana, through Nikos Kotzias and his insistence on “zero troops and zero guarantees, prior to the implementation of any settlement plan”. However, certain sources maintain that in this particular instance Kotzias was acting largely on his own initiative, outside his terms of reference.
Turkey
Since the beginning of the 1950s, when the Turks re-entered the Cyprus game at the invitation of the British, the Turkish stand was materially different to Greece’s.
Turkey adopted and consistently followed the goal of partitioning Cyprus by setting up and arming organisations such as TMT and by patiently waiting for the right opportunity to seek a more active involvement in Cyprus. This grand opportunity was given by the Greek Cypriots in 1974, in the form of the stupid coup d’ etat against Makarios and the resulting visible risk of ethnic cleansing being attempted on the Turkish Cypriots.
From 1974 onwards, Turkey assumed the overall responsibility of supporting the Turkish Cypriots financially, operationally and militarily, through the maintenance of a large military presence in northern Cyprus and by promoting large infrastructural projects, such as the water and the electricity supply of Cyprus from Turkey, the creation of airports, the modernisation of the road network and many other development projects. Another form of dependence on Turkey was the adoption of the Turkish lira as the “official” currency of northern Cyprus and, most importantly, the undertaking of large investment projects on the part of investors based in the mainland.
As one would have expected, the identification of exploitable hydrocarbons in the Cypriot EEZ resulted in Turkey’s interest sky-rocketing.
An important factor contributing to the creation of a confrontational climate between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey was – unquestionably – the excessive force and unnecessary bloodshed caused by Turkey’s “peacekeeping intervention”, on the pretext of restoring the constitutional order in Cyprus. The aggravation was compounded by the unwillingness of the invader to withdraw from Cyprus once the situation normalised. However, Cyprus also contributed to the confrontational climate by adopting the idea of a “long-term struggle”, the rejection of every effort made to find a compromise and the resultant hostile stand against Turkey. The effort of excluding her from the petroleum-related happenings in the eastern Mediterranean is an example.
I have no right to dictate to Turkey how it should behave towards Cyprus. However, I do have the right, as a Greek Cypriot, a citizen of Cyprus and a citizen of the European Union, to ask the Greek government and the European Commission to speak directly to the people of Cyprus, in an honest and straight-forward manner and explain their respective assessments of the situation and their opinion as to what needs to be done, ignoring the flimsy argument that such an approach would weaken the position of Cyprus and of the Greek Cypriot side.
The position we are in demands a higher level of honesty, political courage and political decency on the part of the “motherlands”. In the case of Turkey, I can detect prospects for opening up channels of cooperation between Cyprus and Turkey for their mutual benefit by an adjustment being made by the International Court of Justice to the delimitation line between the EEZs of the two countries, in accordance international law, by the passage of the gas pipeline to Europe through Turkey and by Turkey’s participation in the energy-related activities in the eastern Mediterranean.
Obviously, such a harmonious climate cannot be established for as long as the Cyprus problem remains unresolved. It follows that a Cyprus solution must be found and the motherlands must undertake to stop poking their noses in the internal affairs of Cyprus. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s reaction to the positions taken by the Turkish Cypriot leader underlines the need for the “motherlands” to distance themselves.
Cyprus must be left alone to operate as a “normal” country forming part of the European Union. And the European Union has an obligation to support these efforts.
Christos Panayiotides is a regular columnist for the Cyprus Mail, Sunday Mail and Alithia
