WE ARE now expected to believe that the Cyprus Intelligence Service (KYP) was using surveillance technology to monitor and intercept communications through smart phones and tablets but the government knew nothing about it. This is the latest in a series of falsehoods we have been served since the story about KYP purchasing surveillance software from an Italian company hit the headlines.
The initial response was that KYP did not comment on matters that touch on national security. The next day the agency issued a statement admitting it had bolstered operations with new technical equipment, but “this technology is used solely within the national security remit of KYP and the need and importance of maintaining a reliable operational intelligence service…”
On Saturday, although he had done everything by the book, the head of KYP Andreas Pentaras submitted his resignation, which was accepted by President Anastasiades. Meanwhile, government sources claimed that the president knew nothing about the surveillance technology, a claim that had to be modified subsequently as the €325,000 spent for its purchase had been approved by the Council of Ministers.
The new version was that the cabinet approved the purchase of the software without knowing what it could do. In other words, the government approved spending money on surveillance software without even asking why it was needed and what it would be used for. Is that possible or is it one of several untruths about the matter we have been served in the last week or so?
This charade could have been avoided if the government came clean from the start, explaining that surveillance technology had been purchased for national security purposes, as was the case in all countries of the world. Why was it so difficult to say this? We can only speculate that the technology was not used solely within the national security remit of KYP, as Pentaras had claimed, but was also used to monitor the communications of citizens, including politicians.
This had been standard practice under every government since the technology became available, and it is difficult to believe things were any different under the current one. The only problem was that the information that surveillance software had been bought was made public, putting the government in a very awkward position because nobody would believe that it was used exclusively for national security. If the purchase had not been made public, there would have been no issue and KYP would have been able to carry on freely intercepting the communications of whomever it chose.
Even the legal framework which was prepared by the government and would govern KYP’s operation is no assurance that the service would stop eavesdropping on unsuspecting citizens that are not a threat to national security. Old habits are very difficult to break.
