THERE is much speculation in the media about the outcome of the Polyviou inquiry into last month’s explosion near Mari. It is too early to say what the conclusions are likely to be. However, something decidedly puzzling and at the same time not surprising is beginning to emerge from the chain of the fateful decisions that culminated in the fatal blast at the naval base.
The explosion fits well in the pattern of other major disasters. Numerous warnings over a considerable period of time were repeatedly ignored at all levels of the military and political hierarchy. Even though the explosion was a tragic event, it was not atypical.
At the same time, however, the more we learn about the sequence of events that culminated in the explosion, the more difficult it becomes to explain the actions of those who were responsible for the handling of the munitions. It is fairly easy to say, as many have done so, that those who failed to act should be held to account and punished accordingly. This is what has been demanded by the thousands of people who demonstrated outside the Presidential Palace. This is what they expect, and want, the Polyviou inquiry to conclude. Any outcome other than confirmation of the culpability of those already under suspicion will not be accepted.
But apart from assigning responsibility, an equally important question is why the politicians, military officers and other officials under investigation acted the way they acted? I assume that they were neither misanthrope, nor stupid. If the information that has been leaked to the media about the circumstances in which decisions were made is correct, then the Polyviou inquiry may have portentous implications for the functioning of the political system in Cyprus. To understand these implications, we need to divide events into three stages.
Stage I was the confiscation and storage of the munitions. All available evidence suggests that the munitions were stored improperly and very much in contravention of established rules. It is as yet unexplained why the commander of the base accepted the munitions to be stored so carelessly in the area under his control and responsibility. It is unexplained why the munitions were taken there in the first place and why the officers in charge of military ordnance did not subsequently move them to proper storage facilities.
Stage II was the identification of their eventual destination. It is during this stage that it appears the most egregious political blunders were committed. There are rather strong indications that the political leadership was warned that the munitions were gradually becoming unstable and their containers were deteriorating. Irrespective of whether the munitions should have been sold, destroyed or sent to Syria, they should have been made safe. They weren’t. No one thought of an interim solution until their final destination could be decided. It is baffling that no precautionary measures were taken.
Stage III came the week before the big explosion on 11 July. As early as 4 July there were one or more small explosions. They were the clearest warning on what was about to happen with catastrophic consequences a week later. The commander of the base in the end evacuated most personnel. But if the munitions could not be moved to another location, why were they not made safe? It is incomprehensible that no one attempted to neutralise them.
The picture that emerges is an indictment of the military and its political leadership. Here is a system that seems incapable of enforcing proper procedures and unable to appreciate the consequences of inaction. The search for alternative or creative solutions was left to the top decision-makers. The rest were content to carry out orders. But the top brass and political leaders were anything but leading. Leaked documents reveal them to be indecisive. The officers and officials involved appear to be timid and unimaginative.
The irony is that no one wanted to assume any risk. In reality they collectively compounded risk.
It is true that some of individuals did warn that the munitions could pose significant risk. But available evidence suggests that the warnings were couched in rather general and hypothetical language. No one seemed willing to cause ripples.
Of course, with hind sight it is always easy to make strong statements. But even without the benefit of knowing what eventually did happen, there is little doubt that procedures on the handling of munitions were flouted. It is also hardly an exaggeration to argue that precautionary measures should have been taken and the munitions should have been made safe.
The challenge for the Polyviou inquiry is certainly not in the attribution of responsibility to individuals. That is a fairly straightforward matter. The challenge is to determine the extent to which the lack of initiative by the persons in the know characterises the system as a whole and, if the system is faulty (and I think it is), whether the ultimate blame should be laid at the feet of the President himself. He may then become the first President to resign while still in office.
Sadly, however, his resignation may placate the people but will not remedy the root cause of the problem. The problem is that we have a system that does not tolerate, let alone encourage, individual initiative. It is individuals that safeguard the integrity and effectiveness of any system. If they are prevented by rules or custom from telling unpleasant truths, the system is incapable of learning. It is then condemned to repeat its mistakes.
Phedon Nicolaides is a professor at the European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, The Netherlands. He writes in a strictly personal capacity
