FOR ALL its professed dedication to the principles of international law, Cyprus appears to have eschewed the advice and offers of assistance from the UN Security Council, opting instead to go it alone in handling the cargo of the Monchegorsk.
Former US Ambassador to Cyprus Frank Urbancic nailed it in a cable to the State Department (revealed by Wikileaks): “Greek Cypriots learn Security Council resolutions like others learn their ABCs – early and by heart. No country pays more lip service to their status at the top of the international pyramid. Why, then, the seeming disregard for RoC obligations under 1747 and 1803?”
According to leaked Foreign Ministry documents and correspondence between the government and the UNSC’s Iran Sanctions Committee, which have to come to light in Politis and other papers, on at least two occasions the Security Council urged Cyprus (in writing) to work with other countries who had the capacity and know-how for the safekeeping of a cargo such as of the Monchegorsk – but to no avail.
What’s more, only a few months before the deadly blast of the cargo at Mari on July 11 killing 13 people and wiping out much of the island’s electricity supply, a panel of experts appointed by the sanctions committee requested a visit to the island to inspect the containers. As the documents show, the government turned them down.
According to the minutes of a 2009 meeting in Damascus, revealed by Simerini, ex-Foreign Minister Marcos Kyprianou informed his Syrian counterpart that Cyprus “resisted pressure to send [the cargo] to a third country.”
And the Wikileaks cables appear to confirm Cyprus’ reluctance initially to seize the cargo, which it only did after heavy pressure from the Security Council and the European Union.
After the Monchegorsk set anchor in Limassol, the government on February 3 wrote to the UN sanctions committee requesting guidance.
Once Cyprus found itself saddled with the cargo, the government proposed to the UN sanctions committee that the containers be forwarded to Syria (the original destination) or sent back to Iran.
The Syria option was dropped after it became evident that no nation – Russia included – was in favour.
Subsequently, the head of the President’s diplomatic office Leonidas Pantelides told US officials here that Cyprus was looking for a “way out”. At the time, Nicosia floated the idea that the shipment be sent to Malta – despite the fact that Germany had already offered to take charge of the cargo.
Having given up on the idea of returning the cargo to Syria, the government indicated it was ready to send the containers to a third country provided it had “UN cover”.
In its response dated February 6, the UN sanctions committee urged Cyprus to hold on to the cargo for further checks, and encouraged Nicosia to explore alternative solutions with other states which could help with the storage, safekeeping or disposal of the containers.
Subsequently the chairman of the UN sanctions committee informed Cyprus that the cargo was a clear-cut violation of the embargo against Tehran, that conventional weapons are included in the sanctions, that allowing the ship to return to Iran was not an option.
On February 12 the government informed the sanctions committee in writing that it planned to offload the cargo as it lacked the capacity to handle it. Yet on March 20, the administration told the sanctions committee it would be keeping the containers.
Subsequent events may provide clues as to the reason for the U-turn.
On learning of Cyprus’ decision to keep the cargo, the Security Council again wrote to the government urging it to explore other avenues and solutions with other member states or regional organisations – the latter likely an allusion to the OSCE [Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe].
As has already been revealed from confidential Foreign Ministry documents, the government kept the containers on the island “for political reasons”.
Not only did the Christofias administration twice fail to comply with the Security Council’s recommendations, it appears also to have ceased cooperating with the sanctions committee altogether.
A US government cable appearing in Wikileaks (April 16, 2009) reads: “Cyprus’ new direction under Christofias has made final resolution of the M/V Monchegorsk incident problematic.
“Subsequent RoC cooperation with the UN’s Iran Sanctions Committee (ISC) has been half-hearted…”
Under the relevant UNSC resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran, UN members had the obligation to brief the Security Council and give a detailed report on the contents of seized shipments.
But apparently Cyprus went out of its way to keep the sanctions committee out of the loop. The only information on the cargo offered to the UN was contained in a letter to the sanctions committee on February 3, 2009, which furnished only generic information that was based on a quick inspection of the cargo by the US Navy in January.
It’s possible that nothing sinister was behind the subterfuge. It could be that the government itself did not know the exact contents of the containers, as Pantelides has testified before the House Defence Committee.
The UN panel of experts established in November 2010 was given six months to report back to the sanctions committee on their findings. The experts visited all the countries that had seized shipments originating from Iran – except Cyprus.
On January 28 2011 the panel requested in writing to visit Cyprus to visit the Monchegorsk cargo, and asked which dates were convenient. The government never committed to a firm response.
One can only speculate, but perhaps this can explain why the government turned down repeated calls from the National Guard for a controlled detonation of the containers – destroying the containers would have necessitated providing a full account to the UN sanctions committee.
On March 18 and 20, during a visit to Israel, the UN experts asked the government here for permission to inspect the cargo at Mari. Again, they received no response.
In this way, the government – whether by design or not – missed the opportunity to assess the risk posed by the contents of the cargo.
