IT’S NOT the information, it’s what you do with it that matters. The cargo at the naval base was a ticking time bomb, officials knew it, and yet for almost two-and-half years nothing was done to act on this information.
That’s the picture that emerges from classified government documents leaked over the past few days. They show that as far back as May 2009 the military was warning higher-ups of the risks of keeping the 98 containers exposed to the elements. Fast-forward to Wednesday July 6, 2011, when an on-site inspection of the cargo revealed a blown-out container and traces of gunpowder.
The cargo of the Monchegorsk was transported to the naval base on February 13, 2009. Responsibility for the cargo was transferred from Customs to the National Guard “temporarily.”
A combination of apathy, foot-dragging, red tape, inter-departmental rivalry and classic buck-passing led to a tragedy that could easily have been averted.
The army brass knew what needed to be done, but were apparently shackled by the civilian administration. The military wanted a controlled detonation of the containers, the government said “don’t do anything, wait.”
But it’s also true that the National Guard did not necessarily need the go-ahead from above to improve the storage conditions – for example by building a shelter, or burying the containers underground. They had 29 months to do that.
On May18, 2009, only three months after the containers were stacked at the naval base, then National Guard chief General Petros Tsalikides wrote to the Defence Ministry. The confidential letter, marked “Urgent’, warned of the risk of keeping the containers out in the open without shelter, noting that prolonged exposure to the elements could cause “complete degradation or destruction” of the contents.
“A large proportion of the cargo comprises various types of gunpowder of which we do not know the composition and reaction to high temperatures, nor the potential for their destabilisation, degradation or spontaneous ignition,”
The general went on to recommend building a roof over the containers in the event the cargo (in particular the gunpowder) should remain on the island
“We await instructions on how to deal with the matter,” he concluded.
On July 2, 2009, in a letter to the Defence Ministry, the Attorney-general advised that the contents of the containers could be sold as they were now the property of the state.
On August 6, 2009 a meeting was held attended by Attorney-general Petros Clerides, the permanent secretaries of the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications, senior National Guard officers and the Director of Customs Zeta Emilianidou.
Its purpose was to “discuss the future of the cargo of the Monchegorsk,” as the minutes show.
At that meeting, the military and the Defence Ministry advised that Cyprus could not make use of the military materiel inside the containers as the country lacked the necessary infrastructure. The Defence Ministry proposed also that the non-military items (pipes, copper rods) be sold commercially. The military meanwhile reiterated its position that its responsibilities did not include supervising the storage of the cargo, but also constructively proposed that “gunpowder can be destroyed relatively easily.”
Customs Director Zeta Emilianidou ruled out the option of sending the cargo to Syria or Iran – an idea mulled by some quarters – as it had been seized by the Republic and was now owned by Cyprus.
For his part, the Attorney-general noted that the cargo would remain at Mari “as per the instructions of the President, until such time as instructed otherwise.”
Nicos Emiliou, permanent secretary of the Foreign Ministry, clarified that it was the government’s wish to maintain the current storage until October of that year, after President Christofias’ visit to Syria and his attendance at UN General Assembly.
The meeting, which achieved nothing except maintain the status quo, ended with Emiliou asking the various departments and agencies to prepare and submit recommendations on the “further handling of the matter.”
On December 31, 2009, the Foreign Ministry informed the Defence Ministry (in response to a query from the latter): “The political reasons for which we reached the conclusions last August remain the same and therefore no change in the handling of the matter is necessary for the time being.”
The same line was repeated by the Foreign Ministry on July 7, 2010. This time, the response to the Defence Ministry took nearly a month.
In February 2010, another meeting was held at the Foreign Ministry, where those gathered once again sounded the alarm over the containers and their contents. Once more, the Foreign Ministry cited the aforementioned political reasons and effectively advised “do nothing.”
The last high-level meeting took place at the Defence Ministry on Tuesday, July 5 of this year – six days before the incident. It was called one day after an on-duty officer at the naval base noticed that one of the containers was warped. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Marcos Kyprianou, Defence Minister Costas Papacostas, the National Guard chief Tsalikides, Colonel Giorgos Georgiades (head of the National Guard’s Department of Military Materiel), and Leonidas Pantelides, head of the President’s diplomatic office.
Colonel Georgiades reported the damage to one of the containers, and when asked to offer an explanation said that it “may” have been caused by the explosion of gunpowder inside and the resultant release of gases. The colonel could not say for certain whether the rest of the containers were in danger of blowing up, but did observe that the National Guard had the capability to destroy the cargo if so authorised.
Defence Minister Costas Papacostas next suggested that foreign experts be brought in to assess the degree of hazard. Tsalikides and Georgiades intervened, saying this was not necessary, since the cargo was evidently hazardous, as events had shown
The two military men then proposed that a shelter be built for the containers – but were brushed aside by a Defence Ministry official who argued that this could take months and would cost hundreds of thousands of euros.
Papacostas settled the point by declaring that a shelter was not an option, since by the time it was built the summer would be over.
With that, Colonel Georgiades suggested that the containers should be doused with water two to three times daily to keep temperatures down. A Defence Ministry official disagreed with the idea, saying that might damage the contents of the containers – to which Georgiades replied that the containers had been exposed to the rain for two years anyway.
On the orders of the Defence Minister, an on-site inspection of the containers took place on the following day, Wednesday July 6. The inspectors confirmed the degradation of one of the containers (the locks were intact), and also noted traces of burned gunpowder.
One official even suggested dousing the containers with sea water, but was warned against by a Fire Department officer.
Papacostas had asked to be given for a full report on the inspection by July 6 or the following day. It is not clear when he was handed such a report, if at all.
Five days after the inspection, a massive explosion obliterated the naval base, destroyed the nearby Vassilikos power plant, damaged 150 homes in Mari village, rained debris for kilometers, and most unforgivable of all, killed 13 people and injured over 60.
