For many commentators, Papadopoulos’ role in EOKA, his work in setting up the Republic and his ultra-successful law practice all pale in to near insignificance when compared to his stand on the Annan Plan )
IN A pensive mood once, Tassos Papadopoulos told fellow a DIKO member: “Our generation will come and go. But what we do today will echo on future generations.”
“Those words I shall never forget,” ex Paphos deputy Nicos Pittokopitis said when speaking about the former President and party leader during his last hours.
“What is his legacy? In a nutshell, he was a great patriot, someone who fought for his country his entire life. He was the helmsman who successfully navigated us through a storm and kept the Republic intact as an entity,” Pittokopitis added.
The storm he was referring to, of course, was the April 2004 referendum and the rejection of the Annan plan by Greek Cypriots.
Most likely this single most critical period in Cyprus` history since 1974, is how history will judge the former President, and his words to Pittokopitis will be tested the next time Greek Cypriots – and indeed Turkish Cypriots – are presented with a solution plan.
In the shorter term, current President Demetris Christofias has gone a long way in repairing international relations that were damaged through the Greek Cypriot rejection, although he is having a tougher time mending fences with the Turkish Cypriots.
But at least now the two sides are talking.
During the Papadopoulos presidency, talking seemed to be something to actively avoided.
“They were wasted years as far as the Cyprus problem is concerned,” political observer Sofronis Sofroniou said.
“He did not negotiate enough. He presented the plan as worse than it was – not that it was really good – but it could have been improved if he had wanted to or if he had acted differently.”
Sofroniou said it wasn’t that Papadopoulos didn’t want a solution. “He wanted the perfect solution, and he had expectations from the international community that were too high,” Sofroniou added. “History may not judge him as the most successful of presidents.”
Former Agriculture Minister Costas Themistocleous went a bit further saying Papadopoulos did not want any solution. “He preferred the status quo,” he said.
“This (2004) was the time when a solution was most possible. It was the first time we had a real possibility but he didn’t want it.”
Themistocleous thinks the ripples are still being felt.
“Now things are very difficult, although I don’t want to say impossible. There is always a possibility, but the real chance was in 2004,” he added.
But to those like Pittokopitis, however, Papadopoulos was a saviour. The pro-Papadopoulos mythology portrayed him as a bulwark of Greek Cyprus, the man in whose hands the fate of the island was entrusted.
Some went as far as attributing messianic qualities to Papadopoulos. “He was my second greatest mentor after Makarios,” Pittokopitis said.
“This being a critical juncture for the Cyprus issue, we cannot stress how far his presence would have been invaluable. At these difficult times, his critical thought and patriotism would have been indispensable,” said European Party deputy Rikkos Erotokritou.
“The fact that Mr. Papadopoulos has been disarmed from politics is a testament most unfortunate for Greek Hellenism,” he added.
Sometimes in history a leader appears briefly who may play a particular role that might appear simultaneously popular and unpopular at a given moment.
But if a country’s president is merely a reflection of the conscious or unconscious feelings and mood of the people who voted for him, then maybe Greek Cypriots were simply not ready for a solution. Papadopoulos might merely have been the personification of this, even before the referendum.
No one can know how the Annan plan might have panned out had both sides voted yes. Maybe Papadopoulos was right. Maybe he was wrong. We will never know, because the plan was rejected.
If people were indeed not ready for a solution, especially if it had gone horribly wrong, then Papadopoulos has done his country a service.
But strangely enough this year, the people spoke again, this time in the presidential elections. Rather shockingly, Papadopoulos was ousted in the first round. The mood had changed, not because Greek Cypriots wanted the Annan plan back, but because five years after his election in 2003, and four years after EU accession, the European solution he promised had not materialised.
Not only that, no other kind of solution, and no progress towards a solution were on the horizon. The empty promises had come home to roost.
What angered many Greek Cypriots, even those who had opposed the plan was that Papadopoulos didn’t even try to make it into an acceptable solution.
“He disagreed with the plan, which is something I can respect, but the way handled the issue and the aftermath was a mistake,” said Politis journalist Georgios Kaskanis.
“He played on the people’s fears. He didn’t want the Annan Plan from the beginning. He didn’t try to get more from it either. It was not only his responsibility, but we don’t know what might have happened if a different person, such as Glafcos Clerides was handling it,” Kaskanis added.
On top of that, in the wake of the Annan plan, the Papadopoulos government only played lip service to the possibility of an alternative solution. For 18 months it harped on about the 2006 UN-backed Gambari agreement for new negotiations, which never even reached first base.
“Let’s say the Papadopoulos` presidency wasn’t one of the best periods in Cyprus` history,” said Kaskanis.
During his exit from politics, Papadopoulos said that throughout his term “my thoughts, my decisions and my actions have always emanated from my love for the country and my concern for the people.”
And tellingly, just as Sofroniou deduced, it seems from his parting words that he was in fact holding out for the perfect solution when he said: “…to pursue and achieve the solution we deserve.”
(Additional reporting by Elias Hazou)
Box
The UN mediator during that crucial time in 2004 was Peruvian diplomat Alvaro de Soto.
Speaking of Papadopoulos` role in the ultimate rejection of the Annan plan, de Soto said the negotiations at Burgenstock in Switzerland were specifically designed to provide an opportunity for earnest negotiations between Turkey and the Greek Cypriot side since Rauf Denktash had been eclipsed, and Mehemt Ali Talat, with Turkey, was looking for a deal.
“I regret that he (Papadopoulos) disdained the opportunity that was offered to him, and to the Greek Cypriots, at Burgenstock. We had always heard from Greek Cypriot negotiators that the problem lay in Turkey,” said de Soto.
“A brilliant opportunity was missed to bridge the few gaps remaining. There is no doubt that it was Papadopoulos who passed up that opportunity, quite deliberately,” de Soto added.
De Soto said Papadopoulos had played very ably at the Hague, a year before when he had just been elected, and Denktash was the one who walked away from a possible deal.
All of the blame was thus squarely placed on Denktash.
“He (Papadopoulos) did not hide his dislike for the train in movement onto which he had jumped, but he played along. Some might argue, indeed some did argue, that demanding that there be agreement on the full array of federal laws before submitting a draft settlement to referendum was a delaying tactic,” de Soto said.
“If so, he loyally accepted to proceed once – to everyone’s surprise – that agreement was actually pulled off – those were the thousands of pages that turned up theatrically on the mountaintop,” he added.
Commenting on Papadopoulos` as the possible personification of Greek Cypriot caution over the plan, de Soto added:
“There can be little doubt that the election of Tassos Papadopoulos was decisive, coming at the time that it did.
“I am not educated enough about Cyprus politics to judge, but many Cypriots told me that his election was, at least in part, a sign that Greek Cypriots were nervous about the pressure under which they felt to come to agreement with the Turkish Cypriots. He was seen as someone who would not give in easily and that was reassuring to them.”
De Soto also mentioned the famous emotional televised speech by Papadopoulos on April 7, a few weeks before the referendum.
“It was an artfully crafted piece of political oratory, but I was hoping that he would set the arguments out, pro and con, in a statesmanlike manner, and let the people decide. Instead, he essentially refrained from going into the substance at all, and appealed to sentiment and fear,” de Soto said.
“The killer was, of course, the bit about not accepting a compromise he didn’t like when in a few weeks the Republic of Cyprus would be in the EU and in a position to squeeze a better deal out of Turkey.”
