AFTER WEEKS of bickering at the EU forum of permanent representatives COREPER and behind-the-scenes consultations over the draft of the counter-declaration, the Cyprus government eventually agreed on the content. It may not have been exactly what we wanted, but it was the best we could have secured under the circumstances, a grim-faced President Papadopoulos said at Larnaca airport after the declaration had been finalised, wondering how Cyprus could have held out on its own. The final draft had the approval of 24 member states, including Greece, he pointed out.
Much as he tried to put a brave face on the outcome, the president was not spared the predictable criticism about his failure to impose his terms for the start of Turkey’s accession talks on the EU. He should have taken a tough stance, insisting that Turkey satisfied a long list of conditions – immediate recognition of the Republic, opening up of its ports to Cypriot vessels, withdrawing some occupation troops, stopping the flow of settlers to the island etc – before accession negotiations began, and if these were not satisfied, he should have exercised the veto right, argued the critics.
But what was it that these demagogues wanted, for Cyprus to dictate the EU’s future relations with Turkey? These politicians must be living in cloud-cuckoo land if they seriously think Britain, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Poland and even France, all of which supported the start of accession talks, would sit by and allow a member state with a population smaller than that of one of their middle-sized cities to decide EU policy according to its own national interests. How pragmatic was it to think that tiny Cyprus had the clout to be an instrumental player in the formulation of EU policy and impose its wishes on 24 members of the Union?
The truth is that a large section of our politicians have always suffered from delusions of grandeur, believing that they could take on the big boys and win. The late Archbishop Makarios thought he could play the Soviet Union against the US during the Cold War, and emerge a winner, while Glafcos Clerides thought he could alter the regional balance of power and make Turkey retreat, by deploying strategic missiles in Cyprus. Both ploys proved disastrous for Cyprus.
These delusions reached their apogee with EU membership – certain politicians genuinely believed that once we had joined we would not only be able to use the Union to punish Turkey for the occupation, but also to secure a much more favourable settlement, what came to be known as the ‘European solution’. This was based on the foolish assumption, that the EU was a political paradise, the main objective of which was to right all the world’s wrongs and that all member-states, irrespective of size were equal.
For our idealistic politicians, size does not matter. All EU member-states were equal, they kept repeating in public, implying that a country like Cyprus had as much right to push the EU in a certain direction as Germany or France. In theory, they may be right, but they seem blind to the fact that theory is put in practice only when it suits the interests of the big countries. Anyone with a rudimentary understanding of international politics would have known this, instead of propagating the absurd view that Cyprus could have as much influence over EU decision-making as the big boys.
The myth was laid to rest last December, when President Papadopoulos went to a European summit with a list of conditions that he planned to set in order to agree to Turkey being given a date for the start of accession talks. None were adopted. Papadopoulos, who had also entertained the idea that all member-states were equal, came to terms with the harsh realities of EU power politics after this sobering experience. This was why he adopted a much more pragmatic approach this time round, refusing to raise public expectations or make promises that he knew he could not keep. Had he used the right of veto as some of the demagogues were urging him to, he would have lost the support of Cyprus’ only dependable ally in the Union – Greece.
He chose to improve the text of the counter-declaration, without resorting to the veto threat, prompting additional criticism back home, because the government had wasted precious time over a document of no practical value. Instead, all efforts should have been focused on working conditions into the framework of Turkey’s accession negotiations, the critics argued. Papadopoulos chose not to, because he knew that even if he tried this, he would have achieved nothing as he would have no support.
Consequently, the government concentrated on the one thing it could achieve a tangible result – the wording of the counter-declaration. That is far as the power of a small state can stretch. It is not Papadopoulos’ fault that Cyprus is a tiny state, in a world in which the powerful invariably call the shots. If only the rest of our politicians accepted this, instead of labouring under the ridiculous illusion that not only we can punch above our weight, but can win when we do.
