ON THE morning of December 17, the Cypriot President was faced with probably one of the most difficult moments in his political life. EU leaders had backtracked on a decision regarding relations between Turkey and Cyprus reached only the previous night. Tassos Papadopoulos found himself having to make the tough choice whether or not to veto a decision giving Turkey a date for starting accession negotiations.
According to sources, those two days in Brussels were as tough, if not tougher, than April’s UN-led effort for a settlement.
Through what European politicians have described as “haggling tactics”, Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan managed to overturn the initial European Council conclusions regarding Cyprus. Having the full backing of his staunchest supporter, the British Prime Minister, Erdogan accepted only a reference – paragraph 19 – regarding the extension of the Ankara Agreement (Customs Union) to the 10 new member states.
However, commercial relations between Turkey and the 25 does not imply diplomatic ties, which is why Nicosia had insisted on the need for normalisation of relations included in the first European Council conclusions made public late on Thursday night, only to be scrapped the following day.
To cajole the Turkish leader, the Dutch Presidency and the Commission were quick to confirm publicly that paragraph 19 does not imply recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.
British diplomats at the Summit and even Foreign Secretary Jack Straw himself paved the way by spreading the word that this reference did not constitute de facto recognition. They were, sources say, trying to rectify their “mistake” of two weeks earlier when they portrayed the same reference in the draft conclusions as de facto recognition in a bid to convince Nicosia not to hold a tough stance towards Ankara. Rumour had it that they had leaked the first draft conclusions to the press, obviously not realising the extent of Erdogan’s intransigence on this specific issue.
Cyprus became the victim of what has been described as a short-sighted decision of this generation’s European leaders, who wanted to give Turkey a date by which to start accession negotiations, despite broad public opposition and other deep concerns.
Long before the summit, diplomats were saying European leaders would seek to serve their own national or personal interests and beliefs, while not having to shoulder the risk and repercussions of Erdogan returning home empty-handed
In public, the Turkish Premier was portrayed as a victor, but Turkish journalists in Brussels were pointing out that Erdogan was given nothing more beyond a date by which to start accession negotiations. Some actually believed what was agreed could not have satisfied the Turkish delegation and it would have been rejected, even though to a European what else could Ankara want beyond a date? But Erdogan did want more.
The Turkish Prime Minister had set three red lines for which he fought hard: no recognition of Cyprus, no conditions on the outcome of his country’s accession negotiations and no restrictions and safeguard clauses that would make his citizens ‘second-class’ Europeans. He went away with only the first demand met and the tough terms set were played down.
By any standards, the conditions under which Turkey begins negotiations are hard. Under the heading “Framework for Negotiations”, the conclusions refer to open-ended negotiations whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand. At the same time, if a candidate state cannot fully assume its membership obligations it must be ensured it is “fully anchored” in the European structures, pointing to the possibility of an alternative route.
It also foresees long transition periods, derogations and specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture. In practice, this gives the member states the right to block Turks from entering Europe and could mean Turkey will not be benefiting from the most influential policies and financial aid. Ankara saw these conditions as discriminatory, but even its strong ally within the EU (Britain) could not have them removed. The only addition achieved was an explanation that these clauses “may be considered” therefore will not definitely be used.
The leader who is reported to have insisted on these tough clauses is none other than Turkey’s second strongest European ally. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder may want the vote of some 700,000 Turkish immigrants living in his country in the 2006 elections, but at the same time he had to address the concerns of his citizens that the country will not be flooded with more immigrants.
As for French President Jacques Chirac, he knows it is difficult to get the French to agree to Turkey’s membership; therefore in his televised interview the night before the summit, he promised them a referendum. He is also satisfied with the “open-ended” and “fully anchored” references, which can be viewed as an offer for a “special partnership”. This is what his party (not he) wanted. Whatever the case, though, the French leader will not be around to shoulder any responsibility in 10-15 years’ time when Turkey’s accession talks are expected to end.
The British Prime Minister, on the other hand, argues that the decision will prove wrong those who believe in the clash of civilizations, leaving many baffled. The Turks and the Arabs, some academics believe, share nothing more than their Muslim faith. The Arabs do not view Turkey as their ally nor can they feel the Turks are their representatives. His strong and unequivocal support to Turkey makes Tony Blair come across as America’s voice within the EU.
The US is often called the EU’s 26th and strongest member. One diplomat described the European Council decision on Turkey as an “overwhelming victory” for the US within the EU, as it managed further to enhance its hegemony. Washington increased its influence by securing a date for Turkey, while at the same time it is a well-known secret in EU circles that it influences the majority of the 10 new member states.
The Turkish Premier is reported to have given EU leaders an ultimatum: do they want to satisfy 700,000 Greek Cypriots or 70 million Turks. On the surface, they chose the latter, despite their statements wondering how Turkey could join a club when it does not recognise one of its members. Their decision enabled Tayyip Erdogan to return to a hero’s welcome, as he did not ‘give in’ to a matter of national interest.
However, the seriousness of even having a discussion on recognition of Cyprus by Turkey – beyond words and reasons of public image and prestige for the leaders of the two countries – is disputable. Cyprus will be one of the 25 member states sitting around the table during the negotiations and in the Intergovernmental Conference during which each chapter will be examined and decisions taken unanimously.
Therefore, as many diplomats and the Commission have argued in the past, sooner or later Turkey will have to recognise the Republic.
The issue is how did the EU get to this decision on Turkey? Are the European leaders being honest towards Ankara and Turkey’s citizens? Do they truly want and believe Turkey should join the Union or are they leaving it up to the new generation of politicians like the upcoming Nicolas Sarkozy of France and Angela Merkel of Germany, who believe in a “strong partnership”, to deal with Turkey in a few years’ time?
