IT IS commonplace that without any international pressure on Turkey, and particularly from the European Union, there can be no solution of the Cyprus problem. Such pressure can effectively be exercised when international players link a strategic aim of Turkey to the Cyprus issue.
For the sake of her strategy to join the European Union, Turkey in recent years abandoned the policy of ‘no solution’ on the Cyprus issue and co-operated cleverly in formulating the Annan plan and its acceptance by Turkish Cypriot community, without, though, curtailing her vital interests in Cyprus. Turkey managed in this way to get rid of a heavy encumbrance on her way to Europe, without any cost.
The pressure of solving the Cyprus problem has been shifted onto the Greek Cypriot side, which rejected the Annan plan and speaks about a European, democratic, functional and viable solution i.e. a better solution. Therefore, the following questions arise:
What is this solution exactly vis-à-vis the Annan plan? How and who can influence Turkey to accept such a solution? What is the new element that can achieve to link Turkey’s strategic aims with the Cyprus issue once more in order to make Turkey more flexible? How and when is the negative climate towards the Greek Cypriot side expected to change? What conjunctures are apparent on the political horizon regionally and internationally that can reactivate the key players on the Cyprus issue?
The conjuncture of the accession process of Cyprus, which lasted for three years and operated as a pressure factor on Turkey mainly, is no longer there, leaving behind a debit on the Greek Cypriot side. The tactical movements of the Greek Cypriot side to press in December for the resumption of talks and to accept in February the arbitration role of UN Secretary General while the basic provisions of his plan were unacceptable and while Turkey had, already, behind the scenes, got what she wanted, proved a boomerang.
The only visible conjuncture, which can possibly reactivate the international players and particularly the Europeans, is that of fixing a date for start of accession negotiations with Turkey. There is a possibility during the period September-December that the Cyprus problem will come up again, provided that the report of the European commission in September is not negative and provided that the Greek Cypriot side convince the international community that the changes needed to be made on the Annan plan are not only just and fair but feasible as well.
If the conjuncture of the autumn does not concur or is not utilised as it should, the next opportunity may arise after the accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union, if that ever happens. Once the accession negotiations begin, there will be a long process and the accession event, if it ever happens, will be a distant one.
In the meantime and until then the fait accompli of the military occupation of Cyprus by Turkey will deepen. The Greek Cypriots’ properties will be alienated and the illegal ‘TRNC’ will be upgraded under, unfortunately, the passive eyes of the international community.
The fundamental hypothesis of the two successive opportunities to result in a solution of the Cyprus problem is that the USA and the EU revive their interest to solve the problem. Sadly, there is no such degree of interest at present that can satisfy that condition. Such an interest and consequential involvement of those players can re-appear after the Greek Cypriot side counteracts the impression that it does not want a solution and after it clarifies what sort of a solution it has in mind, with reference always to the Annan plan and provided that it convinces them that the solution it proposes is reasonable and feasible.
The main objective should be to reunite Cyprus and to avoid permanent partition, which is the worst solution. To achieve that, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots have to understand the sensitivities of each other. Additionally, the international community have to realise that as long as Turkey insists in perpetuating her military presence and her political control in Cyprus, it will be difficult to see real progress in the direction of a balanced solution of the problem.
The challenge may be, at present, shifted by the international community onto the shoulders of the Greek Cypriots, but it is pro-rata burdening all the parties concerned, including the key international players, who never tried to see the problem on the basis of principles.
Panayiotis Demetriou is a Member of the European
