U.N. SECRETARY-general Kofi Annan has called for a review of UNFICYP in the wake of the failure of his latest effort to reunite the island, and in the light of the changed situation on the ground, with greatly reduced tensions and the new stability afforded by Cyprus’ membership of the European Union.
Indeed, tensions across the ceasefire line are greatly reduced, with the opening of the checkpoints and relatively unhindered movement between the two communities having passed off remarkably peacefully. And while the European Union is a political and economic community rather than a military alliance, there is little doubt that Cyprus’ membership of the bloc provides the island an unprecedented security guarantee.
And while there is clearly an element of pressure (some would say blackmail) on the Greek Cypriot community in the review, one has to understand the rationale behind it. What’s more, there is an additional case for review in line with UN policy on peacekeeping, and its reluctance to provide an open-ended commitment without the prospect of a political solution. The review “should bear in mind that the implicit central purpose of all peacekeeping operations is to provide an environment conducive to the resolution of conflict,” Annan said in his report on the force, implicitly calling into question the prospects for resolution in the aftermath of the Greek Cypriots’ ‘resounding no’.
The prospect of a radical scaling down of UNFICYP, should, however, be cause for concern on the island. While there is little fear of full-scale military attack in Cyprus (and even if there were, there is little a UN force could do to stop it, just as it was powerless in 1974), there is still the potential for low-level tension, which in the long run could be extremely damaging to Cyprus.
Imagine if, for whatever reason, Turkey did not get its date for EU accession talks in December, fatally undermining the reformist government of Tayyip Erdogan and leading to a resurgence in the military-secularist establishment in Ankara. Imagine if, by then, the UN had decided to scale down its force in Cyprus to a mere monitoring mission, made up mainly of observers. Imagine an unmanned buffer zone and the prospect for a dozen Strovilias (where Turkish forces advanced a few hundred metres into the buffer zone), including, say, a couple in Nicosia. What would that do for confidence in our already battered economy? What would that do to our declining tourism?
Exit polls on referendum day showed the majority of ‘no’ voters citing security as their principal motivation in rejecting the Annan plan. The issues of Turkey’s continued guarantee over the island, of its remaining military forces (albeit falling to just 650 after 19 years) were seen as critical elements in cementing fears about reunification.
It was always a fallacy to feel ‘safe’ with 40,000 Turkish troops in offensive formations across the Green Line, yet how much more insecure would our position be if the UN were effectively to pull out of the buffer zone, leaving a huge vacuum waiting to be filled on a first-come-first-served basis by either side?
In reality, the chances are that members of the Security Council will be pragmatic in their reassessment of UNFICYP. No one – least of all the Americans – has any interest in military instability on the island, and if scaling down UNFICYP is likely to contribute to that instability, the international community is highly unlikely to pursue such a route.
But the questioning of the role of the UN should open our eyes to the fallacy of our satisfaction with the status quo. While most ‘no’ voters will insist they do still want reunification, they will not hesitate to admit that they felt the current situation was safer, more reassuring than the leap of faith they were being asked to make.
We have to realise that the referendum was a watershed; that whether we said ‘yes’ or ‘no’, the status quo was over and the future almost equally uncertain whatever our decision. Our current political isolation, the moves to upgrade the political status of the Turkish Cypriots, the debate over the future of UN peacekeeping on Cyprus, all these are indications that the months and years to come will be very different to the preceding decades of the politically stagnant status quo.
The review of UNFICYP is part of this new dynamic environment, which is moulding the future of Cyprus before our very eyes. We have to take into account the shifting environment, to respond to it and take part in it if we are not to be left behind.
We have to reassess our concerns, and, if we do indeed (rightly) feel a new enhanced security since our accession to the EU, we ought to extend that logic to understand that EU membership is the strongest security guarantee for a united Cyprus as well as a divided Cyprus. For it is not pieces of paper that will ensure our security (either divided or united), it is not Security Council resolutions (we only too well know how much weight they carry on the ground); rather it is realpolitik, the fact that Turkey will simply not treat an EU member state in the same way as it treated the non-aligned Cyprus of 1974.
