THE CYPRUS referenda of April 24 represent a sad and sorry tale of incompetence, malice and complacency of the highest order, at every level of governance.
Here are 10 reasons why it was never going to work:
1. The deal was done in Burgenstock (Switzerland) behind closed doors and well away from the island; while this sometimes can be beneficial in terms of representing neutral territory and being less subject to local pressures, it can also create enormous isolation from local feelings and local knowledge. In this case, some negotiators, including some of the local political parties from the Greek Cypriot community, were able to change their minds on the plane home and start their ‘no’ campaigns on day one.
2. The Annan Plan, as it became known, or Annan V (to indicate its four previous iterations over the past 15 months) was 9,000 pages long. It incorporated many of the legal texts that would have to be passed at various levels of governance and would certainly not win a ‘Plain English’ award. How could the ordinary voter digest that in three weeks? How could they access it? How could you even read it in that time? The only simplified versions that I saw were produced by NGOs.
3. The deal was not a deal; it was the Annan Plan because the talks were supervised, chaired and arranged by the United Nations, under the auspices of Secretary-general Kofi Annan. The parties represented from the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot sides, along with the mainland Greek and Turkish governments, the EU and others worked in spider-like fashion, mostly bilaterally, with the UN personnel, rarely working collectively or multilaterally and without a common agreement at the end of the process. The deal was never signed. It was not a deal. It was a proposal.
4. The Annan Plan represented, in conflict resolution terms “an elite accommodation” between the key political leaders and governments involved, from the UN to the US via the EU and the mainland Greek and Turkish governments, as well as the Cypriot parties, but without any real public awareness, NGO participation or involvement of civil society or ordinary citizens. This can be a fundamental weakness of programmes of this sort in contrast to Mali, the Philippines, Northern Ireland and Guatemala, for example, where people’s involvement rendered the arrangements easier to root in the decision-making process.
5. Only three weeks elapsed between the announcement of the plan on March 31 and the proposed vote on April 24, in simultaneous referenda on the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot parts of the island. For a complicated and lengthy plan of such significance, that was never going to be long enough for the people to absorb the proposed changes, explore ambiguities, seek clarification or guarantees, far less understand them fully and endorse them enthusiastically.
6. The establishment was against. President Tassos Papadopoulos, who had been party to the negotiations, led the passionate ‘no’ campaign from the moment he landed back on the island, with a 52-minute straight to camera plea, ending with a tearful denunciation of the UN and all those who would support the vote; his counterpart on the Turkish Cypriot side, Rauf Denktash followed suit, leading the ‘no’ campaign on the Turkish Cypriot side. The Greek Orthodox Church joined in, with a memorable headline “Bishop warns ‘yes’ voters will go to hell” (Cyprus Mail, 20 April 2004). While referenda offer voters more of a ‘free vote’ (than normal elections), they still look to their leaders; if their political parties vacillate (as AKEL, the largest one did) or are hostile (as the President’s party was), what signal does that send?
7. There was no media balance. On the Greek Cypriot side there are no rules about media balance, so even the state broadcasters could take up a hostile position and fail to present both sides of the case fairly and evenly. The Greek-language print media (not normally regulated in any jurisdiction) lined up four to two against the deal and campaigned vigorously. The State TV and radio stations also campaigned for a ‘no’ vote, squeezing out many ‘yes’ messages and reports. You couldn’t get much of an edge in anywhere for ‘yes’. The well-funded ‘no’ campaign was omnipresent. It was not safe nor comfortable to be ‘yes’.
8. No carrot, no stick. One of the reasons for the unconscionable speed of the whole exercise was to try to achieve reunification before the island joined the European Union on May 1, 2004. However, the Greek Cypriots have joined anyway, leaving the Turkish Cypriots (who voted 2:1 In favour of joining) left outside. There was no carrot (EU membership) to entice the Greek Cypriot side to vote ‘yes’ and no stick (sanctions on EU membership) either.
9. A divided community could easily stay divided. There has been limited violence in Cyprus since 1974 and with the relaxation of controls on the Green Line one year ago after massive people power demonstrations, the Greek Cypriots did not really understand or know their Turkish Cypriot counterparts. This allowed the latter to be demonised in one respect (crime, rape and drugs would increase, it was claimed) and also allowed for the retention of the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriot North with a ‘no’ vote. Whereas the Turkish side were clearly going to vote ‘yes’, this was largely dismissed on the Greek Cypriot side (‘they are just greedy for EU membership and our tax dollars’), relieving any inter-communal collaborative pressures for reunification.
10. Civil society in Cyprus is weak; the normal lively energy and vitality or business, trade union, voluntary and community groups that makes up a democratic and developed society was not present, especially on the Greek Cypriot side, where an island based largely on tourism and small scale agriculture could benefit from EU membership but perhaps less so from other aspects of reunification. On the Turkish Cypriot side, the Chamber of Commerce led the ‘yes’ campaign (extremely impressively and with ultimate success) but again the strong voice of civil society has not yet been heard across the island.
Perhaps the final point is the key one – until a strong democratic and participative civil society is developed on both sides of the island, as an integrated part of the political culture, the politicians and the establishment will be able to rule in a top-down fashion and the people will not be able to take advantage and seize the benefits of global development.
Plus ça change…?
Quintin Oliver ran the successful ‘yes’ campaign in the 1998 Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement Referendum; he now advises internationally on winning referendums. He visited Cyprus three times in April 2004, to observe and advise on the reunification process.
