THE FIRST round of negotiations on the Cyprus problem comes to a close at the end of this week without having achieved any results; the outcome of the procedure now hinges on next week’s four-way meetings involving Greece and Turkey. Rauf Denktash has used the talks so far as a stage to launch his campaign in favour of a ‘no’ vote in the referenda to be held on April 20. Leaving the talks, he regularly addressed reporters in order to “inform” his people, revealing the issues that he had tabled at the negotiations and the replies he had received from President Tassos Papadopoulos, aiming in this way to prove that co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was impossible.
Papadopoulos has followed the same communications tactic as Denktash. In his statements to journalists, he revealed Denktash’s extreme positions and his own “appropriate” response. The statements of the two leaders thus bounced from one side to the other, becoming material for the morning radio chat shows and creating a climate of pessimism and despair.
In an attempt to halt the communications war between the two sides, the United Nations changed its tactics for the last week of the talks, launching separate consultations with the two sides. As part of the give-and-take stage of the talks, Alvaro de Soto handed Papadopoulos and Denktash a document listing the changes that each side wanted, without any prior commitment. On Monday night, Papadopoulos handed the list to party leaders for their appraisal. Almost simultaneously, the Presidential Palace issued to all the television channels the following information: the distribution of issues was unbalanced and Papadopoulos was not happy.
There are serious doubts as to whether this was indeed the case, but even if it was, was this the right way to handle the issue? Most certainly not. The purpose of the leak was to unsettle public confidence in the mediators.
As we near the end of the procedure, the Presidential Palace’s behind-the-scenes campaign is becoming increasingly clear, to twist public opinion and to force the big parties AKEL and DISY, which initially adopted a positive approach to the plan (on the understanding that there would be improvements), to follow Papadopoulos dwon the path of a national ‘no’.
Without fully committing themselves to the plan, the two big parties have been trying to create a more optimistic climate for the future. But Papadopoulos’ party DIKO has already begun an open ‘no’ campaign. The president himself exudes pessimism, is miserable and mournful, giving out the impression that he is being dragged through this procedure against his will.
On the other side of the wall, Denktash, unlike Papadopoulos is unashamedly negative. He has began his own open campaign for a ‘no’ vote, and through his statements is doing his utmost to frighten both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. A double ‘no’ at the referendum would be his greatest vindication.
During this period, the Cypriot people as a whole are being submitted to an unprecedented barrage of psychological blackmail. It is striking to note how, on both sides of the divide, those who disagree with the philosophy of the Annan plan are using exactly the same methods. Denktash is warning the Turkish Cypriots that it will mean the dissolution of the ‘TRNC’, that the Greek Cypriots will come and force them out of their homes, that they will destroy their economy, that half of all businesses will close down because of harmonisation, and that when the Turkish army leaves the Turkish Cypriots will suffer the same fate as in 1963. On the other side, the dire warnings addressed to the Greek Cypriots are that the economy will collapse, that they will have to “feed” not only the Turkish Cypriots but the settlers, that the Turkish occupation will be legalised and that they will lose their national identity.
It is a fact that the Cypriots have not been prepared for a solution by their respective leaderships. That is why they look on the developments with fear. Over this whole period, the executive authorities who control public information, instead of putting before the public the real dilemmas about the consequences of a solution and the consequences of failure to find a solution, have put the public through the grinder of a rampant psychological warfare which has crushed opinion. Cypriots are confused and insecure. They don’t know what tomorrow reserves and they are inclining towards a ‘no’ because that is the path down which today’s security is leading them.
Perhaps after 50 years of antagonism, Greek and Turkish Cypriots have reached the stage where they cannot live together any more, where they cannot stand each other and the impressions created since the opening of the checkpoints are superficial. In such circumstances, better indeed a divorce than a forced marriage. But let the people decide this for themselves, with calm and after careful consideration and thought, not as the result of psychological coercion.
