FOR THE past few days, high level meetings have been taking place in Ankara involving top state officials and Turkish ambassadors from the 15 EU member states, Washington and occupied northern Cyprus. While Greek Cypriot leaders have been celebrating Christmas and Turkish Cypriot leaders have been trying to cobble together a working coalition after this month’s deadlocked elections, Turkey has been drawing up its negotiating line on Cyprus ahead of anticipated New Year talks.
If anyone had any lingering doubts on where the decisions were being taken, this should put them to rest. If the government was rubbing its hands at the hope that the electoral deadlock in the north might let it off the hook of negotiations, it should stop right now. If Rauf Denktash was heaving a sigh of relief at the fact that the opposition had failed to topple him, he too should think again.
The fact is the elections in the north were largely irrelevant. Yes, they proved that a slim majority of the electorate in the north (and a large majority of the Turkish Cypriots) would be prepared to defy their leadership to back the Annan plan in a referendum. That is significant, and it has been one more blow to Denktash’s image as father of his people. His people have grown up, and they don’t want to listen to him any more — they have their own ideas about their future.
But the fact is that it is Turkey that will decide. If Turkey wants a solution, then there is nothing Denktash can do to stop one. If Turkey does not want a solution, then there is nothing the Turkish Cypriot opposition can do to force one – even if it had swept aside the anti-solution parties, which it didn’t.
Turkey, of course, is engaged in a multi-sided, high-stakes poker game and is not about to reveal its cards. We don’t know whether Turkey has decided to solve the Cyprus problem or not. Turkey itself may not know, preferring to keep its options open until the very last. Like any good haggler, it is undoubtedly prepared to walk away from its Euro bazaar if the price asked for membership by Brussels is too high. It would like us to believe that an unsatisfactory solution on Cyprus is just such a price too high, but this is a game of bluff and double bluff, so we will not know until the last.
What is sure is that Ankara wants to show willingness to solve the Cyprus problem – something absent from Rauf Denktash’s antics in The Hague earlier this year. At the same time, it wants to dissociate Cyprus from its own accession criteria, an effort that might have succeeded had Europe been desperate to take Turkey in, but which is almost certain to fail given some member states’ misgivings about its candidacy.
Nevertheless, the information coming out of Ankara gives us an idea of the kind of thinking that is taking place – suggesting a formula that would take into account the risk of Turkey giving in on Cyprus only for Europe to find some other excuse to turn it down. According to reports, one of the key elements that Ankara is trying to change is to allow the continued presence of its occupying forces in Cyprus until the day that Turkey joins the European Union. This suggests an implicit acceptance that Turkey cannot do a straight accession-in-exchange-for-Cyprus deal with Europe.
America and Europe desperately want talks to resume as soon as possible. Turkey wants talks to show Europe that it is not obstructing efforts for a solution (though whether it wants a solution is less clear). Greece wants talks and genuinely wants a solution to normalise its relations with its larger neighbour. The Greek Cypriot side says it wants talks (whether it actually does or not is a moot point, but actually irrelevant given the pressures it will face). The Turkish Cypriot side is divided on whether it wants talks (but again that’s beside the point).
So there is every chance that negotiations will take place in the weeks ahead. Our government has had plenty of time to prepare. The elections in the north provided an extended period which we hope our top experts put to good use, anticipating scenarios, outlining responses, being thoroughly prepared for every possible eventuality. Our president, of course, has sent out mixed messages, one moment talking up the Annan plan, the next talking it down – in his latest Christmas pronouncement he insisted it could not have be put to referendum as it stood.
We assume the hard line talk is tactically pitched to match Turkish intransigence ahead of the tough negotiations and painful compromises to come. We assume the mixed messages are sent out to confuse our interlocutors, again mirroring the tactics of the adversary – one moment Turkey backs Denktash to the hilt, the next it appears ready to drop him.
We assume it’s careful strategy. The other interpretation – bumbling confusion in a political leadership that doesn’t really want a solution – does not bear thinking about.
